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Redaction of Sensitive Data in the Publication of Dual Use Research
of Concern
ABSTRACT The publication of scientific information that derives from dual use research of concern (DURC) poses major prob-
lems for journals because it brings into conflict the benefits of free access to data and the need to prevent misuse of that informa-
tion by others. Recently, a group of authors and a major scientific journal addressed the issue of publishing information on a
newly discovered, highly lethal toxin that can be delivered to large populations and for which there are no available countermea-
sures. The journal addressed this conflict by permitting the redaction of information that is normally considered essential for
publication. This action establishes a precedent for redaction of sensitive data that also provides an example of responsible sci-
entific publishing. However, this precedent leaves many questions unanswered and suggests a need for a discussion by all stake-
holders of scientific information so as to derive normative standards for the publication of DURC.
In recent years, submission of scientific information for publica-tion when the information results from “dual use research of
concern” (DURC) has led to a vexing problem for journal editors.
DURC was defined by the National Science Advisory Board on
Biosecurity (NSABB) as “research that, based on current under-
standing, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge,
products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied by
others to pose a threat to public health and safety, agricultural
crops and other plants, animals, the environment, or materiel”
(http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity). When considering DURC
for publication, journals have struggled to balance the principle
that scientific information be published in its entirety so that it can
be reproduced and gainfully exploited with the concern that such
information could also be used for nefarious purposes.
Perhaps the best-known case for the issues and difficulties in-
volved in publishing DURC arose from the submission of two
papers from independent groups in 2011 describing the ability of
H5N1 avian influenza viruses to acquire the capacity formamma-
lian transmission as a result of several well-defined amino acid
changes that were created in the laboratory (1). In that case, the
NSABB considered the research presented in these papers and
determined that it represented DURC and that sharing of the data
in its entire detail also posed a real risk for either intentional or
unintentional misuse of this information. The NSABB concluded
that the genetic descriptions of the laboratory-engineered muta-
tions could be misapplied with grave consequences and, at the
same time, did not provide a commensurate immediate benefit to
public health or society; therefore, NSABB recommended in 2011
that the mutation sequences be redacted from the papers. After
several months, the NSABB was informed that redaction was not
feasible because a number of factors, including export control
requirements, required that all or none of the research methods
and results be published. NSABB subsequently in 2012 voted
unanimously for the publication of a revised manuscript with all
genetic data from the Kawaoka group and 12 to 6 for the publica-
tion of a revised manuscript with all genetic data from the
Fouchier group. Both papers were published in 2012, and since
that time, at least two other papers reporting laboratory-
engineered mutations that confer gain-of-function in avian flu
viruses have been published (2, 3), with accompanying editorials
explaining the editors’ decisions to proceed with full publication
of scientific details (4, 5).
One of the issues left unresolved from the H5N1 influenza
virus publication controversy was whether there is a practical
mechanism and process for redaction of critical data by journals.
Redaction refers to the results of an action, “to select or adapt (as
by obscuring or removing sensitive information) for publication
or release” (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary). Al-
though one might argue that redaction is routinely practiced by
journals in the process of scientific publishing when reviewers and
editors ask for the removal of certain data or text in order to
improve amanuscript, the type of redaction that we are discussing
here is the deliberate removal of data that under normal circum-
stances would be considered important for furtherance of the sci-
entific enterprise but that constitute a serious potential risk to the
public welfare. Three scientific arguments are generally made
against redacting information: (i) that redaction of data precludes
reproduction of the study, (ii) that the data must be published
because they are essential for supporting the conclusions of the
paper, and (iii) that based on principle and tradition, scientific
data born in the free pursuit of knowledge shall remain openly
available. Implicit in the last argument is the notion that such
informationmay find usefulness in future studies even when such
benefit may not be discernible in the present. A fourth legal and
policy issue concerns compliance with export control and Inter-
national Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) requirements. These
arguments and issue have created a high standard and barrier
against the use of redaction. Consequently, most if not all papers
that describe DURC have resulted in full publication. In fact, we
are not aware of any prior examples of redactions in life science
publications over security concerns.
Recently, the Journal of Infectious Diseases (JID) published two
papers reporting a new type ofClostridium botulinum toxin that is
not neutralized by existing antitoxins (6, 7). After the authors of
the study voiced concern about the DURC implications of this
discovery and the risks associated with open dissemination of the
toxin sequence, JID took the unusual step of waiving its require-
ment that sequence information described in the manuscript be
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deposited in public databases, and none of the critical genomic
sequence information was published (8, 9). The need for limited
distribution of these data is only temporary, since the develop-
ment of specific antisera to the new toxin is likely to be feasible in
the near-to-midterm future. Hence, JID decided to transmit the
important new information that there is a new botulinum toxin in
nature but not the detailed information that could be used by a
skilled person to produce this toxin. We are not aware of a formal
review of this decision by the respective federal agencies responsi-
ble for export control (Department of Commerce) or ITAR (De-
partment of State). The latter issue remains a concern.
We consider this action to be an example of responsible scien-
tific journalism and commend JID and the authors for exercising
prudence and responsibility. Furthermore, we believe that this
action may establish an important precedent if it indeed complies
with export control and ITAR requirements, or inspires a revision
of these requirements so as to comply. JID has shown that it is
willing to follow through with the mechanism that the NSABB
originally recommended in regard to the H5N1 gain-of-function
work. This redaction provides an example of responsible authors
and editors working together to diminish the negative externali-
ties associated with DURC.
We note that the redaction of critical data by this journal leaves
many unanswered questions and opens new conundrums. For
example, howwill the data be shared with responsible scientists so
that the work can be independently confirmed and antidotes gen-
erated? What is meant by a responsible scientist? Who can have
access to the sequence information? How will the data be pre-
served so that they are available to future generations? Are there
sunset provisions on the withholding of scientific data for publi-
cation? Answers to these questions cannot be expected from one
journal alone, let alone a group of interested scientists. The gov-
ernment of theNetherlands has required an export control license
for the publication of an H5N1 paper (10), and the requirements
for similar licenses in other countries for the publication of
DURC, if any, need to be clarified. We call for a discussion by all
stakeholders of scientific information, including the broader sci-
entific community, representatives from the publishing world,
funding agencies, the pharmaceutical industry, the general media,
and the rest of the public, in order to forge a consensus on how the
results from future studies involvingDURC are to be handled.We
note that NSABBwas not involved in discussions about the recent
botulinum toxin papers. Although members of the U.S. govern-
ment were consulted, this is an example in which an investiga-
tor(s) takes the initiative in identifying dual use research of special
concern (11). Over the past decade or so, much progress has been
made in identifying issues involving DURC, including the issu-
ance of guidelines and reports by the NSABB and others world-
wide. Furthermore, there is now considerable awareness of the
potential for life sciences research to generate information that
can be used for both good and harm. Although theremay be some
lessons from experiences in the physical sciences with nuclear
weapons technology, research in the life sciences is easily under-
takenwithmodest infrastructure by individuals and small groups.
The action taken by JID and the authors in publishing redacted
forms of the botulinum toxin work suggests that redaction is a
feasible option for some in the world of scientific publishing who
arewilling to take the lead in pushing forward important issues for
discussion.
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